son for this changed way of thinking is that it is now possible,as a result of closer study,to find present in this period a number of political, social,economic,and cultural elements that really can be thought of as the buds of what would flower in modern times,and that were not found in Japan's ancient or medieval times.The following are some specific instances of what I mean. First of all,it was in this period that the decline in the ancient power structure of the Imperial Court/court nobles and religious bodies became definitive.This did not mean only the collapse of the ancient and medieval political systems(the bureaucratic system of national,imperial rule established by the legal codes [ritsuryo] ,together with the landed estate [shoen]system);it also meant the end of religious power,as symbol ized by Oda Nobunaga's burning of the Mt.Hiei shrine complex in 1571.This gave birth to a society in which secular economic values and rules had the most powerful influence on people's conduct . In the fourth place we have the system of four classes(warriors, farmers,artisans,and merchants),which meant the establishment of specialization relationships.Because the warriors living in the castle towns stopped having anything to do with material produc tion,they had to start buying what they needed from the farmers, artisans,and merchants.Further,because their control over land was weakened,they experienced a change in status,from being landed nobles to being more of what you might call administrative The fifth factor that must be mentioned is the fact that the cur rency being used in the country was standardized by the Tokugawa Bakufu.In the early years of the Tokugawa regime the government produced gold and silver coins,and then from1636it minted large quantities of copper coins for use as currency among the gen eral populace.The principal currency in use from medieval times through to the end of the civil war period had been coins import ed from China,and the governments in Japan had been unable to establish their own currency-minting rights.But when the coins from China came into short supply with the decline of the Ming Dynasty and the stagnation of China's commercial activities,at the end of the civil war period worn and mutilated Chinese coins,as well as forged coins,started being circulated,so that currency transactions started running into troubles.The Tokugawa govern ment's adjustment to the currency system went a long way towards improving the situation and played an important role in the devel- Almost all of the Edo Period merchant houses are said to have been individually proprietorships,with hardly any of them having the form of a joint-stock company.Still,this does not mean that there were no joint enterprises;on the contrary,early forms of such companies developed in a variety of forms.
Among merchants engaged in trade in the early decades of the kinsei period,prior to the country's seclusion policy,bottomry involving nagegane(money thrown in)bonds,or else an arrange ment similar to Commenda(which is defined as a pioneering form of joint investment between non-functional capitalist with limited liability and functional capitalist with unlimited liability)was prac ticed.1The way it worked was that,when the owner of a ship licensed by the shogunate was planning to send it on an overseas run,a trader,having first borrowed capital from an investor,would present a certain amount of silver to the ship's owner,the journey would go ahead and the trade made,and,when the ship returned safely and the trader had made his profits,the profits would be 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION THE HOUSE OF MITSUI
As the scale of their operations increased,the commercial sphere expanded geographically,and operations diversified,the large merchant houses were forced to put some order into the control of their businesses. In the case of the House of Mitsui we find that,in the early days under the direction of Takatoshi,all the operations were in the grip of Takatoshi,even when the family was running both dry goods shops and money exchanges.The
Kyoto money exchange was the management center,and the dry-goods shops had to settle their accounts every six months and deposit all their earnings at the money exchange,retaining only working capital.The dry goods shops were in effect subordinate to the money exchange, and they were run on a rough-estimate sort of budgeting proce dure.After Takatoshi died,his children decided to run the Mitsui business on a joint management basis;but in order to lighten the shopkeeping burdens of the head of each of the consanguineous families,the actual running of the shops came to be entrusted to managers who acted as proxies,running the shops in place of the family heads.This arrangement next made it imperative that there be some structure in place for exercising overall control of,and management of,several shops at once.Thus it was that in1705a head office operating division was set up to integrate the Kyoto and Edo dry-goods shops.This operating division was independent of the money exchange division and served to integrate the drygoods operations.Similarly,in1719the three money exchanges in Kyoto, Edo,and Osaka would be combined into the money exchange operating division.Later the Osaka dry-goods shop,the Kyoto Kimono Buying Shop(which specialized in purchasing Nishijin goods),the Matsusakaya (the shop in Onoda,Edo),the Edo cotton fabric shop,and the Edo Kimono Purveyor Office were added to the head office operating division,while the two raw-yarn whole sale shops were added to the money exchange operating division.8 The omotokata,which had been founded in1710,was,as men tioned above,a structure set up to own the capital of the various Mitsui families,but at the same time it also acted as a headquarters in control of the head office and money exchange operating divi sions.The Mitsui organization as it stood in1730is shown in Table1.
The organ that exercised overall control over the entire Mitsui family business operation,the omotokata,was run by means of In the Edo Cotton Fabric Shop(as of1691)the main sections were a large division engaged in the purchasing and procurement of goods by employees who traveled to Koshu(Yamanashi),Hachioji, Echigo(Niigata),Joshu(Gumma),Fukushima,and Shinano (Nagano),and a large sales division engaged in selling to cotton goods retailers and the like;the shop had only a small-scale control division.11
There tended to be large numbers of hokonin in the employ of these shops in the dry-goods line.In 1733the Edo Kimono Shop employed223,the Kyoto Kimono Shop142,the Osaka Kimono Shop108,the Edo Mukai Shop113,the Edo Itchome Kimono Shop73,and the Kyoto Kimono Buying Shop(also called the Nishijin Ueno Shop)24.In the money-exchange shops,on the other hand,there were fewer people employed,so that in1731,for example,the Kyoto money-exchange shop employed22,the Osaka money-exchange shop17,and the one in Edo only12.12This was probably due to the fact that,whereas in the money-exchange busi ness very few deposit transactions were made and the main opera tions were the appraising of gold and silver and exchanging them, loans to a very limited number of clients,and exchange drawings, in the dry-goods business a wide variety of operations were involved,from purchasing stock to manufacturing,dyeing,sewing, finishing,and sales;there was great variety,also,in the types of goods dealt with;and,finally,people were needed to deal directly with customers. teen sections under the control of the head office manager,deal ing with such matters as secretarial work and correspondence, accounting,purchasing,real estate management,and so on.It employed23ordinary clerks(tedai)and13child apprentices (kodomo),most of them in the management area.15In the Besshi Copper Mine,on the other hand,as of1769the copper mine man agement division had five work-site divisions:mining,refining, charcoal making,transport relay,and shipping.It had (aside from around3,000miners)only47hokonin(40ordinary clerks and7 child apprentices),of whom14 were deployed in the management division and the rest spread out among the work-site divisions.16
The Shimomura(Daimaru)dry-goods shop that opened in Fushimi Kyomachi in Kyoto in1717was followed by branches at Shinsaibashi in Osaka in1726,Nagoya in1728,and at the intersec tion of Yanagibaba and Anekoji roads in Kyoto in1729;by about the year1770there were ten shops in existence,and by the end of the Edo Period there were thirteen shops in the three major cities of Kyoto,Osaka,and Edo.The founder of the business,Hikoemon Masahiro Shimomura,retired in1743on the occasion of the open ing of the Edo shop,and a year after his retirement the family established a motokata system similar to the omotokata system of the House of Mitsui,in order to run the numerous shops in a more organized fashion.Until this point in time the House of Shimo mura consisted of the Karasuma head-of-the-family household and three independent branch families:the Fushimi household,the Chojamachi household,and the Yanagibaba household.The head family managed the general head office in Kyoto,the Edo,Nagoya, and Osaka shops,the Nishijin Ueno shop,and the Osaka and Mukai money-exchange shops,while the Fushimi household man aged the Matsubara shop and the hardware shop,the Chojamachi household ran the Kobeniya,and the Yanagibaba household ran the East shop(silk fabrics).The way the motokata system worked was that all the shops controlled by a household contributed funds to the motokata,the heads of all those shops held a motokata meet ing at which they discussed overall management policies,and an audit was made of each shop.Thus,for example,in the case of the motokata of the general head office,it received funds from the Shimomura head family and used the funds as working capital, which it invested in the general head office,the Osaka shop,and so on; after the settlement of accounts that was made every term, each shop would have to make a10% monthly interest payment and turn over its profits.Of these money payments,80%of the interest payments was put into the motokata funds,and the remain ing20%,along with the profits,were given to the head family.
This motokata system was a structure for all the households in the Shimomura family to have capital ownership and overall control of their business operations,but in1771another structure was set up to exercise overall control of the House of Shimomura business:an o motokata.Still,even after this new structure was in place,in the House of Shimomura organization the head family and the three branch families enjoyed a strong independence,in that they held partial ownership in all their shops,with the result that the overall controlling power of the omotokata was not as strong as it was in the House of Mitsui. The personnel system in place in the Daimaru organization was a well-developed hierarchy.Under the family head there followed the positions of genro,robun,sojime,motojime,shihaigashira/ kamikin ban,shihai/shimokinban,ninsokumawashi,and lesser executive-level employees,while on the lower echelons the order started with shi hai/toyaku,tsugi shihai,fukushihai/yakuchu,retsugashira,wakashu, kodomogashira,kashirashita,down to the detchi on the bottom of the ladder.
THE HOUSE OF TOMIYAMA(DAIKOKUYA)18
The Tomiyama family from Ise-Isawamura grew into a large busi ness family when they went into Odawara,and then later into Edo, The Kyoto shop was divided into37(!)operating divisions in 1734,and it employed20ordinary clerks and(chief)clerks(tedai and banto).It handled a large variety of goods,most of which were Nishijin dry-goods materials purchased through the mediation of Nishijin wholesalers.Whereas Mitsui's Echigoya owned a shop that bought directly from Nishijin,the Tomiyama family relied on indi rect purchasing.A new purchasing shop was set up in Fujioka (Gumma Prefecture)in1688;the following year a dry-goods shop was opened in Osaka;in1704a money-exchange shop was juxta posed with the Osaka dry-goods shop,but in1725the Osaka money-exchange shop became independent.The main business of the Fujioka shop when it was first established was that of pawn broking,but as the Fujioka region developed into an area specializ ing in the production of silk-related articles,the shop began to spe cialize in silk-related trade,and it became the most important source of dry goods for sale in the Edo shop. The result of the establishment of so many new shops was that by the second decade of the eighteenth century the Tomiyama family,with its base unmoved from Ise,had become a powerful dry-goods merchant house and money changer in the three major cities of Japan.At the start of the eighteenth century the Dai kokuya was ranked among the four largest dry-goods trading estab lishments in Edo,along with Echigoya,Izukura,and
Iwaki . geographically and in diversity,in the1720s the house fell into a business slump.Its net assets had stood at5,956ryo in1673,then went on from there to grow remarkably right into the eighteenth century,so that by1715(so far as we can determine from historical records,the peak of the house's prosperity)the house had net assets of153,289ryo,or more than25times what it had in1673.By 1729,or fourteen years later,however,the assets had been halved, to76,482ryo,and they kept decreasing,so that in the period1751-1763they were down to approximately20,000ryo.The direct caus es of this reduction in net assets are said to have been increased debts in the Kyoto shop and irresponsible bargain-sale policies adopted at the Edo shop.But the remote causes of the house's business slump are considered to be problems connected with the system in which the house's consanguineal families'capital was combined.
After the eighth-generation family head,Sadatsune(Joshin), passed away in1657,the House of Tomiyama decided on a proper ty inheritance scheme according to which the200portions that should were supposed to be allotted to the eldest son,Chozaemon, and the100portions each that were supposed to be allotted to the second son,Kizaemon,and the third son,Ichirozaemon,were in fact not allotted to them,and instead these should be invested as huge amount that rebuilding its fortunes became an impossibility, and it had to go through bankruptcy proceedings and go out of business. This example of the House of Tomiyama serves as an excellent contrast to the case of the House of Mitsui.Like the Mitsuis,the Tomiyamas were from the Ise area and they built up a similar sys tem.Yet the organization that they put in place to consolidate the capital of the consanguineal families in order to maintain the house's estate did not fit in with the strategies of business expan sion and the business just collapsed and disappeared from the scene.
THE HOUSE OF NAKAI19
The House of Genzaemon Nakai had its start when the founder, While Mitsutake was still engaged in itinerant peddling the only shop the family had was the main family shop in Hino,but as his business activities expanded he started opening shops throughout the country.Besides shops that the Nakai family opened on their own,there were also a large number of shops that took the form of joint operations with local capital.The circumstances that occa sioned the adoption of such a joint business form were sometimes the inability of a debtor to repay a loan to the Nakai family,so that the operating rights were transferred to the Nakais,or sometimes the expansion of a local merchant's business operations,leading 19For this section I rely heavily on Tsuneharu Egashira's Omi shonin Nakai -ke no kenky u [Studies on the Omi merchants,the House of Nakai], Yazankaku,1965. him to ask the Nakai family to invest some money in the project,or sometimes the opening of a shop as a branch shop when the Nakai family supported a hokonin who wanted to set up a separate family, with either the main Nakai family or one of the branch shops joint ly investing with the hokonin.
Each of these branch shops or outlets had its own independent accounts and was a separate enterprise responsible for its own results,so in a sense it was like a limited partnership(goshi-gaisha) involving unlimited liability local businessmen and the limited lia bility Nakai family,but generally speaking all the shops were united under the large capital umbrella of the Nakai family.As the busi ness activities of the branch shops developed,the functions of the main family shop,as a shop,gradually waned,and no actual busi ness activities were carried on there.The hokonin in the main fami ly shop were limited,from the manager level and under,to only a handful of ordinary clerks and child apprentices.At the same time, however,the highest functions in management-control of plan ning,personnel,and finances-were firmly in the grasp of the main family shop. Among the large merchant houses that flourished after the middle of the Edo Period(such as the House of Nakai,for example),we can find a separation between ownership and management.In one respect the reason for this can be given as the family head's inabili ty to keep operations within his span of control,as a result of such things as expansion in enterprise scale,geographical expansion of commercial activities,increasing numbers of shops,multiple types of business operations,and diversification.Still,this was not the only reason.As we can see in the cases of such houses as Konoike and Mitsui,perhaps the principal reason was that each of the mer chant houses had taken on the character of a legal body that was independent of the personality or character of the individual head of that house. We can liken the position of the family head of an Edo Period merchant house to a runner in a long-distance relay race,and the house's estate to the sash the runner has over one shoulder.The objective of the relay race is to see how the sash can be passed on from one runner on the team to another and arrive at the goal, and each runner is only somebody who is running the section of the race to which he is assigned.It may be fine for a runner to run hard and set a new record,but he is not allowed to run more of the distance that the section allotted to him.In the Edo merchant houses,likewise,the first objective was the taking over and carrying on the sash of the house estate,and the setting of a personal record by the current family head was not a primary consideration. In the House of Mitsui each of the nine families that owned the o motokata was in charge of some shop or shops,but the relation between the shops and the families was not a fixed one:the omo tokata was always the owner of the shops,and the nine families only held them in keeping for the omotokata.In addition,the actual run ning of the shops was being entrusted to managers.Now,if they just left the management of the shops completely to managers,it could happen that some managers might take arbitrary actions,so to have overall supervision and prevent such things from happen Control of the branch shops owned by the Omi merchants of the House of Nakai,which had opened branch shops throughout the country,did not follow a single pattern,but the motokata in Sendai was entrusted with wide-ranging authority by the head fami ly,and he in turn transferred authority to the various branch shops.The Sendai motokata's settlement of accounts included not only his own operating results but also the accounts of the branch shops and pawnshop under his charge.According to the records, the branches to which authority had been entrusted were visited eriodically by the family head;when he arrived at a branch shop he would inspect all the shop's books,gather the employees and read to them the regulations contained in the house rules,and explain the fundamental management policies.Where reform was needed he would decide on courses of action and have the employ ees pledge to comply with these faithfully.31In the case of the House of Nakai,then,even though management was entrusted to the local managers,it would seem that,because the house did not have as long a history behind it as the houses of Mitsui and Konoike did,the family head held the real authority.
We can see from the above instances,then,that the practice of entrusting management to high-ranking hired managers such as shihainin or banto was a common occurrence among the large mer- To forestall arbitrary decisions by family heads or managers(shi hainin or banto),most of the merchant houses made much of deci sion making on the basis of a discussion system.The house rules of the Mitsui and Konoike houses contained articles that fixed a cer tain day of the month for a meeting and that stipulated that impor tant matters were to be decided by mutual discussion.These meet ings were also the occasion for a reading out of the house rules and shop regulations before the assembled company.In the house rules of the House of Sumitomo's Nagasaki shop there even was a prescription that the prices of the goods handled in the shop were to be decided by mutual discussion. net assets.When the san'yocho began to be used in1670the House of Konoike had become one of the ten licensed money exchang ers,and it was a time when the house was shifting the focus of its business from merchandise transactions towards financing opera tions,mostly in the form of daimyo loans.It can be surmised that the establishment of a systematic method of keeping its books was closely related to such a major change in business operations.In the san'yocho the weight of entries was placed on loans and borrow ings and on the turnover of capital,and what stands out are the fact that calculations of profit and loss for the period are not car ried out clearly,and the fact that there is no entry for fixed assets. But these facts probably are expressions of the distinctive charac teristic of this house,which was a money lender relying mostly on owned capital. The accounting methods used by the Genzaemon Nakai family of Hino in Omi were established sometime around the middle of the eighteenth century.They used separate ledgers for different accounts and one daybook as the basic ledger for a comprehensive account,and from these they produced a statement of accounts called the tanaoroshi mokuroku(inventory general ledger),which consisted of a balance sheet portion and a statement of profit and loss section.Eiichiro Ogura made a painstaking study of the house's accounting methods,and he concluded that theirs should be called a multiledger double-entry bookkeeping method,and he singled out as its distinctive features the very clear(from a book keeping standpoint)concept of capital(seen in the term mosho kin),the high level of its method of calculating inventory and com puting the earnings and expenses for a period,the double enter ing of transactions,and the fact that it was a consolidated settling of accounts of the main office and branch shops that had,built into it,management criteria for branch-shop management and a system of responsibility for results.The time when this accounting method was adopted by the House of Nakai was a period when the house embarked on its program of opening up large numbers of shops,and it is believed that this accounting method was intro duced as a means of exercising overall financial control of the many branch shops. 
LABOR RELATIONS IN THE MERCHANT HOUSES THE HOKONIN SYSTEM
The mainstay of the Edo Period merchant house workforce was the kogai hokonin(apprentice trained from young boyhood)who served from the time he began his detchiboko(youth apprentice ship)in the merchant house.In almost all cases in which someone set up a separate family after going up the ranks through tedai to shihainin,that person had served from boyhood,whereas someone who had joined the merchant house after the genpuku ceremony (celebrating a boy's attainment of manhood, usually at17or18) would in most cases not be entrusted with important business mat ters.This was so true that the hokonin system of the Edo Period is in general referred to as the detchi system. apprenticeship would be served;this certificate would be sealed jointly by the boy's guardians and a witness(guarantor).On the surety certificate would be written the boy's place of origin,his family background,the conditions of employment,the term of ser vice,and so on.If the hokonin were to be guilty of misconduct,the certificate would stipulate,the guardians and witness would make compensation.Because there was a Bakufu regulation banning terms longer than ten years,usually a ten-year indentured appren ticeship was the form taken,but it was not unusual for this to be changed later,and for the period to be extended to much longer periods.
The places of origin from which hokonin were accepted were lim ited,depending on the shops.In the case of the House of Hasegawa,who were merchants from Ise with shops in Edo,of the 114hokonin in their employ in the1820s,94%were from the Ise area.42The Omi and Ise merchant families thus tended to employ people from their own districts.In the case of Mitsui,however,for the Kyoto shops they would not employ anybody who was from Kyoto or from anywhere within a 95-kilometer radius of the city, while they assigned to the Edo shops people from Kyoto or from within an 18-kilometer radius of the city.43By having their appren tices work in places far from their home towns they no doubt aimed at widening their horizons and helping them grow into mature merchants.
While it often happened that hokonin were taken in through per sonal connections,it was also common for them to be taken in through an employment agent.Some shops would not accept eldest sons,because of the possibility that they would have to leave in the middle of their apprenticeships in order to take over a fami ly headship,and sometimes,too,shops avoided taking on relatives' or in-laws'children,because they wanted to preserve the secrecy of their business operations.Among powerful merchant houses like the Mitsui and the Konoike it was common to employ the children of trusted branch or separate families;these were referred to as fudai hokonin (hereditary hokonin).In the merchant house it was 42See the work by M.Kitajima cited earlier(n.29) .
43Mitsui Bunko,Mitsui jigyo -shi,Honpen,vol.1,p.248.
138JAPANESE YEARBOOK ON BUSINESS HISTORY-1996/13 almost exclusively boys who were taken on as hokonin to work in the businesses,and girls were almost never employed for such work.
For work in the kitchens or for housework,however,girls might be employed,but not necessarily:it is claimed that in the Edo and other shops of Ise merchants even the cooking was done by boys.
The ranking of hokonin positions was commonly referred to in terms of detchi(youth apprentice),tedai(ordinary clerk),and banto (chief clerk).On the basis of a seniority-system principle tempered by a tinge of a rewarding-abilities philosophy,each of these grades had many subdivisions.I have already explained something about the ranks in the Mitsui and Shimomura houses in an earlier sec tion.A hokonin's rank showed his status in the shop,and his name and attire were decided accordingly.
The youth apprentices were commonly called kodomo(child), kozo(youngster),bozu(boy),or similar terms.They were assigned all manner of add jobs in the shops and households;they also received lessons in reading and writing and the use of the abacus. Except for some clothing issued at the Bon Festival and the end of the year and a small amount of pocket money,they received no pay for their work.But as a general rule the family for which they worked assumed all expenses for their daily food,clothing,accom modation,and the care of their health.In the Mitsui,Konoike,and other merchant houses these youth apprentices entered service between the ages of12and14.
Once a boy had his genpuku ceremony at17or18and became a tedai,he gradually took on greater work responsibilities.When he was ready he was allowed to engage in sales,he received a fixed salary,his name and attire were changed,and he began to be treat ed as a full-fledge shop employee.Shops differed in their practices, but the period for which a young man would be a detchi and a tedai would last roughly from fifteen to twenty years,during which time the boy received training in all facets of the business. When a young man served out the fixed period of his detchi and tedai apprenticeship,he was released from the obligation of living in and was allowed to have his own household;he became a yadomochi (householder).This would mark the end of his service as a live-in employee.The question is,how many of those apprentices who started out as kogai hokonin actually reached that goal? Between1696and1730the Mitsui Kyoto main shop took on239 kodomo.When we follow their later careers,we find that28of them died during their service,19left because of illness,7voluntarily asked to leave,77were dismissed,30retired
somewhere along the way in an arrangement satisfactory to both sides,for65we
do not have details,and13rose to the rank of tsftkin shihainin or higher (in other words,only a little over5%of those who were taken on).45It was roughly the same in the House of Konoike:from1719 to1741,those who retired from the service along the way num bered51,8died,and3went
into an adopted-son arrangement;32 were discharged,27of them by dismissal.In the Konoike system a young man could expect to be in some sort of semimanagerial role at28-29,be allowed to marry and have a separate family at32-33, and,if he was an industrious worker,be allowed to set up his own business at42-43.But during that period from1719on,less than 10%of the young men taken on by the Konoikes were helped to become established as separate families.46Even though it was pro fessed to be a lifelong-employment system,in actual reality it was very difficult to make the long climb from detchi to separate family. 46S.Yas uoka,Zaibatsu keisei-shi no kenkyu.
